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The Socioeconomic and Health
Context
Mexico is a large country (population
109 million) with a per capita income of
US$8,300 (purchasing power parity
US$12,800) in 2007, and as can be seen
in Table 1, a highly stratified society [1].
In 2006, Mexico spent about 6.6% of its
gross domestic product (GDP) on health
care, of which 44% was public expendi-
ture (see Table 1) [2].
Constitutionally, Mexico is a federation
of 31 states and the Federal District, but
the federal government has always main-
tained centralized political and fiscal
power. During most of the 20th century
Mexico was governed by one authoritar-
ian political party, the Partido Revolucio-
nario Institucional (PRI), which won
practically all elections at all levels of
government. The health system evolved
along the lines of other Latin American
countries (see Table 2). Per capita expen-
diture varied widely, from US$1,100
through the Petróleos Mexicanos (PE-
MEX) to US$126 through the MoH [3].
An important early innovation in health
care was the extension of free Instituto
Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS) ser-
vices to very poor rural areas through a
program known as the Coordinación
General del Plan Nacional de Zonas
Deprimidas y Grupos Marginados (CO-
PLAMAR, General Coordination of the
National Plan for Deprived Areas and
Marginal Groups). Beginning in 1973 in
selected regions, the IMSS-COPLAMAR
program significantly broadened access to
quality primary and hospital care. Users
were highly satisfied with this program. In
1984, the infrastructure and care respon-
sibilities of COPLAMAR were transferred
to the 14 states that accepted the decen-
tralization reform (see below), and services
deteriorated significantly [4,5], thereby
undermining Mexico’s most successful
health program servicing underserved
communities. The program is still active
in the states that did not decentralize and
is now called IMSS-Oportunidades.
The First Health Care
Decentralization Reform: 1983–
1994
In the early 1980s, the economy of
Mexico suffered its worst recession since
the Great Depression. The peso was greatly
devalued [6], unemployment soared, and
real income plummeted. In addition, an oil
glut reduced demand for Mexican oil. Oil
production is a nationalized industry in
Mexico and the country’s first source of
income. Consequently, the PRI-led gov-
ernment did not have sufficient cash
reserves to repay its accumulating national
debt. The WB and the IMF were ready to
lend but, as a condition of their loan, they
demanded, as they had done in other
countries, that Mexico reduce its public
social expenditure, including its expendi-
ture on health and education [6].
At that time, the WB promoted the
decentralization and privatization of
health services with the objective of
transferring fiscal responsibility to states,
municipalities, and users to free the central
government’s resources and thus expedite
the repayment of public debt. However,
the labor unions successfully opposed the
decentralization and privatization of
IMSS, which was temporarily divided into
eight administrative regions, and the first
reform was, therefore, limited to the
decentralization of the MoH [7]. Follow-
ing the guidance of the WB, the MoH
presented the reform as a means to
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Summary Points
N Mexico’s neoliberal health care
reforms began in 1983 as a
condition for Mexico to receive
loans from the World Bank (WB)
and International Monetary Fund
(IMF), which were needed be-
cause of the 1980s world reces-
sion.
N The first reform (1983) was a
failed attempt to decentralize
the Ministry of Health (MoH) by
transferring financial responsibili-
ties without devolving adequate
decision-making authority to the
states.
N The second reform (1994) ad-
vanced the decentralization of
the MoH and attempted to in-
crease the exposure of the major
public social security scheme to
private sector competition.
N In 2003, a third reform, the
Seguro Popular (SP), emphasized
improved access and services for
the poor.
N Although accessibility has in-
creased, the Mexican reforms
have not resulted in significant
reductions of health inequities, or
in increased efficiency, productiv-
ity, or quality, despite their costs.
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improve efficiency and quality, increase
productivity, and make the health care
system more participatory.
Decentralization agreements specified
the new responsibilities of individual states,
including the requirement for a substantial
increase in funding from the state. Depend-
ing on the economic condition of each
state, between 20% and 40% of health
expenditure became state mandated. The
decentralization was expected to be com-
pleted by 1986, but by 1987 only 14 of the
31 states had decentralized (see Table 3).
Most studies [8–12] have concluded
that this first decentralization effort, which
ended with the change of government in
1988, failed to improve efficiency, in-
creased health inequities, and had a
negative impact on quality. The official
estimate of the cost of this first reform is
staggering: 140 billion pesos [13], or
approximately US$452 million.
The 1988–1994 administration (which
was also led by the PRI), reversed course
Table 1. Socioeconomic and health disparities.
Variables National Average and Range (Lowest and Highest Values)
Education index (2002) [44] 0.82 (state range 0.74–0.90)
Income index (2002) [44] 0.74 (state range 0.59–0.90)
Human development index (2004) [45] 0.81 (state range 0.71–0.88) (municipal range 0.38–0.91)
Households with access to water (2005) [3] 94.5% (state range 85.2–98.4)
Life expectancy (2005) [22] 73 y old for men, 77.9 y old for women (There is a 10-y difference in life expectancy between
the poorest and richest groups.)
Infant mortality rate (2004) [45] 19.7 per 1,000 live births (state range 14.4–26.3)
Maternal mortality rate (2005) [22] 63.4 per 100,000 live births (state range 9.6–126.7)
Mortality due to infectious diseases (preventable and
avoidable if there is timely access to health care) [3]
In poor communities, 25% of deaths for children ,5 y of age are due to infectious diseases; in
affluent communities, the corresponding figure is 5%.
Health resources
Per capita expenditure 2005 [22] US$498 per capita (state range 316–1,103)
Private health care expenditures 2005 (95% out of pocket) [22] 54% of health expenditure is private (state range 28.5%–76.5%). In 2003 [41] health expenditures
represented 8.5% of income for lowest income decile and 2.6% for the highest income decile
Public health expenditure as percent of GDP (2006) [3] 2.9% of GDP (state range 2–8.2%)
Physicians per 1,000 population (2005) [22] 1.9 (state range: 1–4)
Beds per 1,000 population (2005) [22] 1.1 (state range: 0.6–2.5)
Nurses per 1,000 population (2005) [22] 2.2 (state range: 1.3–4.6)
GDP, gross domestic product.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000124.t001
Table 2. The Mexican health care system (prior to 1984).
Functions
Public Social Security Schemes for Formal Sector
Workers and Families Uninsured Affluent
Responsibility for services and
typical coverage of total population
(percent varies each year according
to employment conditions)
IMSS for private formal sector employees 40% MoH 46% Private
insurers 3%
ISSSTE for government employees 9%
SEDENA & SESMAR for armed forces 2%
Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) for oil workers less than 0.5%
Financing Social Security schemes were financed from three
sources: the employer, the government, and the
employee. The proportions paid by each source
were different for each scheme.




Health care providers A network of clinics and hospitals staffed and
operated by the different schemes
A network of clinics and hospitals staffed and
operated by the MoH. Some states and
municipalities had developed their own network.
Private
network
The IMSS-COPLAMAR program, which was
financed by the MoH and operated by the IMSS,
provided health care mainly in rural areas.
Access to services Free at point of service (including medications) Free at point of service (including medicines for
priority programs)
Varied
Per capita expenditure Large variations depending on the type of scheme Varied by state Varied
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000124.t002
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and stalled the decentralization of health
services. The president’s office managed
large new social services programs and
funded local groups of its choice—a shift
that was perceived by observers as an
attempt to recentralize decision making.
State and municipal PRI politicians felt
bypassed and were outraged, citizens grew
impatient at the lack of services, and popular
support for the PRI reached an historical
low. The health service delivery model
continued as in the previous administration.
The Second Health Care
Decentralization Reform: 1994
Onwards
The PRI government elected in 1994
understood that to win future elections it
would need to modernize by increasing
public participation and decreasing its
traditional authoritarianism. It quickly
launched a program known as The New
Federalism. Decentralization was one of
this program’s key components. The cen-
tral government increased health funding to
the states and transferred decision-making
power (see Table 4). By 1999, all the states
and the Federal District had signed the new
decentralization agreements [14].
Central fund allocations to the states
continued to be based on historical budgets.
In particular, the powerful and wealthy
states did not want to see their allocations
reduced in order to increase the allocations
of poor states. Indeed, funding disparities
persisted and even increased as the wealthy
states increased their own allocations and
were able to charge higher copayments.
Case studies carried out in several states
found that decentralization increased
health coverage (through an increase in
the number of health facilities and the use
of mobile teams), but that the health care
system remained inefficient, with relatively
low levels of productivity in spite of new
incentives. Community participation also
remained very weak [14].
Failed Attempts at Health Care
Privatization
Throughout these years, the WB con-
tinued to promote the privatization of
health services in response to a policy that
promoted market competition as a way to
increase productivity and quality. In 1985
the Mexican minister of health founded
the private Health Foundation (Funsalud),
which was funded by transnational corpo-
rations operating in Mexico including
tobacco, pharmaceutical, and food corpo-
rations (http://www.funsalud.org.mx/).
The WB worked closely with Funsalud,
which was led by Julio Frenk, and with Juan
Luis Londoño, the Colombian minister
responsible for the 1993 Colombian health
reform. In 1997 Frenk and Londoño
coauthored an article entitled ‘‘Structural
pluralism: towards an innovative model for
health system reform in Latin America’’
that outlined the Colombian and WB’s
health reform policy tenets [15]. These
tenets stated that: (1) publicly run systems
are inefficient and of poor quality; health
care based on market competition can
achieve higher productivity, efficiency,
and quality; and (2) market competition
creates a more flexible labor force.
In the structured pluralism model for
health care, the funding follows the
Table 3. Organization of health care for the uninsured in the 14 decentralized states (1984–1994).
Responsibility for Services State Health System
Financing Federal government, state governments, and user fees. States committed to increase their allocations to health,
Health care providers A network of state health services: all public facilities to be managed by the state health secretariats (including
IMSS-COPLAMAR). Federal health employees refused to become state employees because salaries and fringe
benefits tended to be lower. Labor unions refused to accept the decentralization. All state health workers were
given the opportunity of becoming federal employees. Ironically, most workers at the state health secretariats
are now federal employees
Access to services User fees for services and medicines. Medicines for priority programs were free.
Per capita expenditure Varied by state
Devolution of decision-making power Minimal: programs continued to be designed by MoH; states had very little control over financial resources
(except for user fees). Personnel appointments continued to be made by MoH
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000124.t003
Table 4. Organization of health care for the uninsured after the second decentralization reform (1996).
Responsibility for Services State Health System
Financing Federal government, state governments, and user fees
Health care providers A network of state health services: all public facilities to be managed by the state health secretary. The majority of state
employees became federal employees, states gained some control over human resources, programs, and finances
Access to services User fees for services and medicines. Medicines for priority programs were free. Attending physicians often waived fees for
the indigent.
Per capita expenditure Varied by state
Devolution of decision-making power States obtained some control of personnel. In coordination with the state branch of the worker’s union, they could
transfer and fire personnel, and recommend new federal hires.
MoH transferred ownership of physical infrastructure to the states.
The states were allowed ample discretionary power to spend federal transferred funds, except the funds allocated to
human resources, although they were able to use the unspent personnel funds (due to absenteeism, leaves of
absences) at their discretion.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000124.t004
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patient, whereas in the traditional model
funds are allocated to health care networks
regardless of the services provided [15].
Structured pluralism advocates universal
coverage through insurance-based systems
in which the premium for the poorest
people is subsidized by the government
and in which public and private institu-
tions compete to capture clients. Govern-
ment regulates the system by monitoring
performance and financing the services for
the poor.
In 1997, the WB granted a loan of more
than US$700 million to Mexico’s health
sector, but the terms and conditions of this
loan were negotiated without the knowl-
edge of the National Congress. A leak to
the press by Congressman Rojas Arreola,
a member of the Partido de la Revolución
Democrática (PRD) center-left opposition
party, revealed that one of the components
of the loan potentially weakened IMSS by
allowing its beneficiaries to choose be-
tween available public and private provid-
ers [16]. Rojas Arreola and the labor
unions interpreted these changes as the
beginning of the privatization of IMSS,
and, with the support of Congress, de-
railed the attempt.
However, the formula used to finance
IMSS was changed by a law approved in
1995, which became effective in 1997.
The government’s contribution was in-
creased and the employees’ contribution
was decreased, especially for those with
higher incomes. These changes and the
country’s economic downturn decreased
the financial and human resources of
IMSS [17]. As a result, services deterio-
rated and some felt that major structural
changes were needed, including an in-
crease in the role of private insurers and
private providers. Interestingly, a 2005
article by Frenk and Knaul indicates that
Mexico intended to increase the role of the
private sector: ‘‘The [Mexican] reform
builds on earlier and ongoing experiences
in other Latin American countries such as
Colombia and Chile…’’ [18].
People’s Health Insurance
(Seguro Popular)
In 2000, after almost 70 years in power,
the PRI lost the national elections to the
Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN), a
conservative party, and Frenk was ap-
pointed minister of health. Aware that the
labor unions would block the privatization
of IMSS, a third health care reform was
proposed called the System for Social
Protection for Health (SSPH). This re-
form, which is commonly known as the
People’s Health Insurance or Seguro
Popular (SP), was approved by a Congress
controlled by opposing parties.
SP is a voluntary family health insur-
ance program for the uninsured that was
designed by the federal government and
financed through conditional grants of-
fered to the states by the federal govern-
ment for its implementation. It was
promoted as a program to provide free
insurance to the poorest of the poor and
contained a firm commitment that services
would be publicly provided [17]. Notwith-
standing this commitment, the MoH has
allowed SP to contract with the private
sector for health services. The roll-out of
SP began in 2004, diverting focus from the
previous decentralization effort.
As indicated earlier, by 2000 decentral-
ization was making some headway al-
though there were problems. A knock-on
effect of this ongoing decentralization was
that when the MoH found that the states
implementing SP were not always follow-
ing the intended design, decentralized
decision making prevented the MoH from
intervening. Indeed, the minister viewed
decentralization as an obstacle to SP [19].
The organization of health services for
the uninsured after the third reform is
presented in Table 5. Family contributions
to SP are based on a sliding-fee scale, and
are waived for families in the lowest two
income deciles and for those in the third
lowest income decile with a child under
5 y of age. The federal contributions are
based on a per-enrolled family fee plus a
solidarity supplement for the poorer states.
These states have the greatest proportion
of poor and uninsured. Because the state
contributions to the program are set on a
per-enrolled family basis, the poor states
that have the highest proportion of poor
and uninsured have to make a higher
contribution than the wealthier states,
thereby increasing geographical inequity.
SP beneficiaries receive a package,
which is periodically increased, of free
health services, pharmaceuticals, and care
Table 5. Health care delivery for the uninsured after the creation of SP.
Functions
Uninsured Not Affiliated to SP (Remains Basically
Unchanged) Affiliated to SP
Responsibility for services State health system State Health System. The System for Social Protection for Health (SSPH), also
referred to as SP, decides the services to be provided to the insured, and the
protocols to be followed
Financing Federal government, state governments, and user fees The financing formula is very complicated. The MoH and the states make a
fixed per family contribution. Enrolled families contribute to the system based
on a sliding-fee scale. The federal government allocates extra funds to the
most marginalized states.
Family premiums are waived for families in the lowest two income deciles and
for those in the third lowest income decile with a child under 5 y.
Health care providers A network of state health services: all public facilities
to be managed by the state health secretary.
States can decide, usually a network of private and public facilities and
providers.
The majority of state employees are federal employees;
states have some control over human resources, programs,
and finances
Often the state is unable to provide mandatory package of services and there
is a need to contract with the private sector.
Access to services User fees for services and medicines. Free at point of services (includes 312 medicines)
Medicines for priority programs were free. Attending
physicians often waived fees for the indigent.
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for some catastrophic events. As of De-
cember 2008, the package covered 266
interventions, 18 catastrophic events, and
312 medicines [20], and could be provided
by accredited public or private clinics and
hospitals. Nineteen states and the Federal
District have contracted with the public
and private sector and 11 states have
contracted with institutes of social security
for the provision of services. Michoacan is
the only state that has not contracted out
any services. Care for most catastrophic
events (84%) is privately provided [21].
Despite the public sector having low
productivity levels (in 2005 general prac-
titioners and specialists had an average of
18 and 2.4 consultations per day, respec-
tively) and relatively low hospital occu-
pancy rates (72.2%) [22], SP has required
heavy infrastructure investments and sub-
stantial recruitment of personnel for its
implementation including: 1,724 new
health units [10] and 102,000 additional
workers with temporary contracts, i.e., a
flexible labor force [23]. According to a
source in the Mexican Ministry of Health,
who wishes to remain anonymous, in
August 2008 about 45,000 of these
temporary workers were to receive regular
staff status, thus further increasing the cost
of SP. According to 28 states these
resources are not sufficient [21]. The cost
of the SP program for the year 2007 was
US$2.75 billion or an average of US$377
per family (with the federal government
responsible for 69% of the cost).
Assessments of SP
The objectives for the creation of SP are
presented in Box 1. Several recent reports
have assessed the SP. Positive assessments
of SP by Frenk and colleagues that were
published in The Lancet in 2006 and in an
earlier publication by Knaul and Frenk
[18,24–28] have been questioned by
independent researchers. Specifically, con-
cerns exist regarding cost effectiveness and
impact on equity of SP [17,29–31]. For
example, by the end of 2007, the SP had
enrolled mainly people who did not have
to pay and about 35 million persons
(61.9% of the eligible population) re-
mained uninsured.
According to early evaluations [21,32]
the SP has improved access to medical
care including the treatment of chronic
diseases (diabetes, asthma, arthritis, and
high blood pressure) and the provision of
pharmaceuticals and dental care. SP has
also lowered out-of-pocket expenditures
for the enrollees (see Box 2). A more recent
study [33] has confirmed that SP has
successfully reduced catastrophic and out-
of-pocket expenditures, especially among
the poorest, even though it has had no
effect on medication spending, health
services utilization, or health outcomes.
However, some critics suggest that the
SP was designed to allow the private sector
to provide care and to compete with
public providers thereby diminishing the
public sector role [17]. In other words, the
implementation of SP in Mexico has
followed the examples set by Chile [34]
and Colombia [35] in the reform of their
health care services.
Poor Coordination and
Implementation Constraints of SP
The administration of SP is complex. At
both the federal and state levels, there are
several departments and units involved in
the implementation of the SP, and, unfor-
tunately, coordination among them has
been poor. Furthermore, since its creation,
SP has evolved without a detailed long-term
view of the system and without appropriate
management and evaluation tools [32].
The expansion of entitlements and changes
to entitlements that have occurred as the
federal government has understandably
increased subsidies have generated confu-
sion among providers and beneficiaries, and
continue to threaten the appropriate imple-
mentation of the program. As Sojo [7] and
Urbina [32] have pointed out, the designers
of the reform did not foresee the outcomes
of certain policy directions.
Boxes 3 and 4 list causes of administrative
dysfunction in SP and documented imple-
mentation problems and illustrate addition-
al potential implementation constraints.
Efficiency of SP
Some of the implementation shortcom-
ings of SP presented in Boxes 3 and 4
create inefficiencies in health care provi-
sion. For example, the small amount of
funds collected through family fees may
not offset the cost of collection. Also, the
determination of eligibility for fee waivers
is costly and is done annually.
Critics note that SP has further frag-
mented and stratified Mexico’s health
system [30,36,37], a process that is likely
to have a deleterious effect on its efficien-
Box 1. SP Objectives [18,24]
N Establish a system of universal access based on social insurance
N Improve the allocation of resources by defining a package of cost-effective
interventions
N Decrease out-of-pocket expenditures, especially for the poor
N Make the distribution of federal resources to the states more equitable
N Increase competition among service providers to raise productivity levels and
improve the quality and efficiency of the health sector
N Protect the funding of public health interventions
N Protect families from excessive health expenditures
Box 2. Independent Assessments of SP’s Impact
N About 62% of SP enrollees were able to access needed services compared to
54% of the unenrolled [32]
N During the 2 wk prior to one survey, free medicine was received by 68% of SP
enrollees and by only 60% of those not enrolled [21]
N No differences were found between enrolled and unenrolled people in access
to preventive services [21]
N SP enrollees tended to access health services less frequently than the rest of the
population [43]
N Two surveys reported a difference of 2.2% to 3.2% in enrolled families and
unenrolled families seeking coverage for catastrophic events in the SP program,
respectively, but a third survey failed to document any difference [21]
N Two surveys reported 17% and 18% lower out-of-pocket health expenditures
among the families enrolled in SP compared to unenrolled families,
respectively; a third survey did not find a significant difference [21]
N Unfortunately no information is available on the quality and efficiency of the
services provided through the SP system. Urbina commented that the quality of
the services is perceived as deficient, which may have a negative impact on the
re-enrollment of eligible families [32]
Mexican Health Reform
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cy. Moreover, because public (health care)
employees can earn additional income by
working in the private sector, with the
implementation of SP they have even
more incentives to decrease their produc-
tivity in the public sector and to divert
patients to their private offices. These
conflicts of interest are expected to grow
as the role of the private sector expands.
In addition, the undisclosed increase in
administrative costs associated with the
implementation of SP is worrisome [7],
especially when taking into consideration
that prior to the SP the Mexican health
system had the highest administrative cost
of the 30 countries that are members of
the Organization for Economic Co-oper-
ation and Development [38]. In 2007,
Mexico’s auditor general confirmed that
the SP budget was insufficient to cover all
services promised and affirmed that the
allocation of hundreds of millions of
dollars had not been documented [39], a
statement that raises questions about the
sustainability of the SP, especially in view
of the current global economic crisis.
Equity of SP
In 2007 large interstate differences
existed in the proportion of persons
enrolled in the SP. Some states had
enrolled more than 70% of eligible poor
families, whereas in other states less than
30% of eligible families had been enrolled
[32]. Poorer states and those with the
largest number of indigenous persons were
the slowest to enroll eligible families [21],
probably because, among other reasons,
they may not have had the required
matching funds. Furthermore, there are
unexplained differences in per-family
health expenditure by state. In 2007 the
average per-family total expenditure was
US$377 but varied between US$208 and
US$511 between states. Similarly, the
average per-family federal allocation to
the state was US$259, with a range of
US$123 to US$378 across the states [32].
The fact that some wealthier states are
receiving higher than average per-family
federal allocations while some poor states
receive lower than average allocations
suggests that an attempt by the federal
government to rebalance geographical
health inequities has not worked.
Discussion
Mexico’s attempts at health reform have
been extremely convoluted. The first
decentralization reform of its health care
system was a response to requests from the
WB and the IMF to free central funds to
pay its external public debt during a world
recession. After 6 y, only 14 states had
agreed to be decentralized. The remaining
states understood that decentralization was
not accompanied with the additional
funding needed to undertake the new
responsibilities that decentralization was
transferring. The decentralized states soon
protested the minimal transfer of decision-
making power as well as the demands
made by the central government for
additional state funds.
The next administration (1988–1994)
understood that the cost of decentraliza-
tion had been high and its achievements
negligible, and the decentralization pro-
cess was halted. This administration took a
different position on how to develop the
country politically and economically and
decided to centralize all new social service
programs in the president’s office. Politi-
cally, the results were catastrophic and
political analysts forecasted the end of the
PRI hegemony.
Recognizing that political changes were
needed to remain in power, the subse-
quent PRI administration decided to
reduce political authoritarianism. One
measure it took was to transfer decision-
making power and funding to the states,
thus initiating the second decentralization
of the health sector. There was also an
attempt to implement a reform along the
lines of the structured pluralism model,
which was derailed by the IMSS labor
unions.
Finally, new efforts to privatize the
delivery of care commenced when SP
was launched by PAN at the start of this
century. Unfortunately, the designers of
the SP ignored the implementation con-
straints of a program prepared without
concurrence from the states. In particular,
the decentralized states did not have to
adhere to the requisites mandated by the
MoH. The ministry soon realized that
decentralization was impeding the imple-
mentation of SP, and although govern-
ment documents continued to mention
decentralization since the inception of SP,
no attempts have been made to advance
decentralization further.
One state policy maker in Sonora
explained the designers’ failure to foresee
implementation problems when he re-
ferred to the designers: ‘‘[as researchers]
experimenting with models, always gener-
ating ideas that were not very practical…
did not have their feet in the real world…
kids from Harvard with no social experi-
ence, out of touch with the people with
needs’’ [40, p. 192]. Consequently, only a
Box 3. Causes of Administrative Dysfunction within SP [21]
N Decision making is dispersed among many divisions and units of the federal
MoH and state health secretariats
N Decentralized states do not always feel obligated to follow the directives of the
federal MoH
N There are discrepancies among the federal and state laws and regulations
N Many federal and state employees are still unfamiliar with the regulatory SP
framework
N There has been a failure to establish a monitoring and evaluation system to
control the performance of the SP at the local and state levels
N The states have limited managerial capacity
Box 4. Documented SP Implementation Problems [21,39]
N Inadequate guidelines for the accreditation of SP facilities
N Federal government funding below promised levels
N The use of funds for purposes other than those for which they were intended;
for example, funds allocated for catastrophic events have been used to cover
immunization programs, and funds earmarked by the MoH for health needs are
being used by the states for nonhealth purposes
N Bureaucratic rigidity and slow implementation of contracts
N Inaccuracies in the data gathered by the information systems (including
financial reports) and deficiencies in the processes used to determine the
income of SP eligible families
N Tensions between the state ministries of health and the person responsible for
the financial management of the SP
N Limited progress in signing SP portability agreements among states
Mexican Health Reform
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few states had the planning resources to
design an insurance scheme for the poor,
and now Mexico has 32 variations of the
SP, with unforeseeable equity and porta-
bility problems.
There are also design incongruities
within the SP. It is a voluntary program
that promises to have the entire popula-
tion insured by 2010. Five years after its
inception, however, less than 1% of
eligible families pay premiums, and 74%
of the premiums that are collected come
from the state of Tabasco; in all other
states practically all the enrollees have had
their fees waived. According to the SP
designers, the 35 million people who are
unenrolled but eligible (most of whom will
have to pay premiums) should be enrolled
by 2010. However, this group may prefer
to continue paying copayments at state
facilities unless they perceive a drastic
deterioration of quality in these services.
This deterioration could occur if the MoH
reduces the allocation of resources to the
state health services. If such a policy takes
place, the 17-y decentralization effort to
strengthen the states’ health systems would
be lost. Families could also decide to join
the IMSS program for the uninsured, an
option that has been available for a
number of years but that very few have
chosen, probably because the concept of
insurance and prepayment of premiums
are not part of the culture among less
affluent people.
Although SP must improve in many
areas to reach its goals, its designers
highlight successful aspects of the program
and cite the millions of people enrolled in
the program. These successful aspects are
inevitable; poor families are insured at no
cost as a result of the massive allocation of
additional resources that has created two
parallel state-run health care systems for
the uninsured. Increasing health funding
in Mexico is important, but independent
evaluations suggest that SP is not the most
successful model to achieve equity, effi-
ciency, and quality care.
SP enrollees have always had access to
public health services with a copayment.
Exempting the poor from copayments
might have been a less expensive way to
accomplish the same end result as the
implementation of SP. Better and more
equitable results, probably at a lower cost,
might also have been achieved by helping
the IMSS to increase its efficiency and
workforce productivity, and by expanding
its programs for the uninsured. Instead,
according to observers, SP may reduce
employers’ incentives to offer Social Secu-
rity coverage [7,37,41], and SP may
expand at the expense of IMSS [18],
especially now that the MoH’s priority is
the SP [42].
Given the lack of continuity for social
programs in the past, it is hard to foresee
the future for SP with any degree of
certainty. Future governments could de-
cide to transfer SP to IMSS or to state
health departments to promote a more
complete decentralization. Alternatively,
they might continue to provide subsidies
for those already enrolled in the SP. If the
SP program continues to build on the
principles of the Colombian reform, how-
ever, the effects of SP on the Mexican
health care system may not be necessarily
positive.
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Asociación Colombiana de la Salud-ASSALUD
y Facultad de Economı́a-Universidad de Rosario,
In press.
36. Coneval (2008) Informe de evaluación de la
polı́tica de desarrollo social de México. México,
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Revista Nexos 358. Available: http://www.
nexos.com.mx/vers_imp.php?id_article = 1494&
id_rubrique = 651 Accessed 25 October 2008.
38. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) (2005) OECD Reviews of
Health System. Mexico. Paris: OECD. 158 p.
39. Servicio de Noticias ISA (2007 9 April) Confirma
la auditorı́a superior de la federación el manejo
demagógico e irregular del Seguro Popular.
Denuncia Laurell. Number 57. Available:
h t tp : / / w w w . i n f o r m a t i v o i s a .o r g / i n d ex .
php?n = 57&lang = es. Accessed 6 December
2008. This comment is based on the following
report: Informe del resultado de la revisión y
fiscalización superior de la cuenta pública 2005.
Informe ejecutivo. Mexico City: Auditorı́a Supe-
rior de la Federación. pp 179–181.
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